Introduction
But for a few hundred votes cast in Florida, the 2000 presidential election might have been remembered as one in which voter mobilization efforts, spearheaded by labor unions and African-Americans, carried the day. Trailing in the polls days before the November 7 th election, Democratic candidate Al Gore went on to win the popular vote and carry several closely contested populous states, such as Pennsylvania and Michigan.
Attributing Gore's success to voter mobilization, strategists of both parties have taken a renewed interest in get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign activity, and it has become an active topic of both political discussion and scholarly research.
Building on previous experimental studies of voter mobilization campaigns, this paper examines the role of two widely used techniques for mobilizing voters, direct mail and calls from commercial phone banks. During the 2000 general election campaign, the NAACP-National Voter Fund (NVF) alone sent out a total of 6,697,755 mailings and completed 5,246,225 phone calls. Several recent studies have examined the effectiveness of campaign mail and phone calls. Using a randomized experimental design and very large samples, Gerber and Green (2000) found nonpartisan direct mail to have weak positive effects on voter turnout. Gerber, Green, and Green (2003) , summarizing several large-scale experiments, found partisan mail to have little if any mobilizing influence. Green (2000, 2001) found nonpartisan appeals made by commercial phone banks to be ineffective, although phone calls from noncommercial phone banks do seem to stimulate voter turnout (Green and Gerber 2001 ).
The present study fills an important gap in this emergent literature. Here we examine the effectiveness of a mobilization appeal expressed by and directed to AfricanAmericans. The NVF crafted its appeal so that it would speak to the concerns of AfricanAmericans (e.g., hate crime, racial profiling, educational opportunity). The phone bank's callers were African Americans. While these messages did not explicitly advocate the election of a particular candidate, they were on the whole much more partisan than the League of Women Voters' appeals studied by Green (2000, 2001) . And unlike the partisan mail that has been studied in previous research (Gerber, Green, and Green 2002) , the mail sent by the NVF was part of a campaign that focused primarily on mobilizing an audience whose preferences lopsidedly favored one candidate.
What makes this study of direct mail and phone calls particularly interesting is that these are not GOTV techniques that are ordinarily associated with the mobilization of African-American voters (Leighley 2001) . African-Americans, by comparison to the population as a whole, have lower proportions of listed telephone numbers. Their lower rates of homeownership and higher levels of residential mobility make them more elusive targets for direct mail. Although the NVF also devoted its energies to mass media appeals and to door-to-door canvassing, millions of dollars were allocated to phone calls and direct mail. The question is whether these staples of contemporary campaigning are effective in mobilizing African-American voters.
This study uses randomized field experimentation to address this issue.
Registered voters were randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions. Those in the treatment group were encouraged to vote by means of direct mail and phone calls.
After the election, public records were used to assess the voter turnout rates of the treatment and control groups. With nearly one million participants, this study represents the largest field experiment ever conducted in political science.
Unfortunately, it is also a study that confronted a number of operational problems.
In some states, certain members of the control group received calls from the NVF phone bank. Some members of the treatment group were never called for lack of a listed phone number, and some were never mailed because their names were added to the master list after the mailings had already been sent. Fortunately from an analytic standpoint, these types of complications have become familiar to statisticians in other experimental disciplines, such as public health, where medical treatments frequently find their way into the hands of the control group rather than the treatment group. Our statistical analysis makes explicit allowance for these infirmities and takes care to produce robust inferences.
Had the experiment been executed flawlessly, the data would speak to the effectiveness the NVF's campaign with a very high degree of precision. As it stands, the experiment leaves some room for uncertainty but nonetheless supports a clear conclusion:
direct mail was ineffective; phone calls were marginally effective; and neither was an economically efficient means for producing votes. The principal advantage of direct mail and phone banking seems to be that it enables campaigns to get their messages to very large numbers of people with short lead time.
Study Description
Scope and nature of the mobilization campaign. In the months leading up to the November election, the National Voter Fund purchased data files containing the names, addresses, and in some cases phone numbers of more than 3.7 million registered voters presumed to be African-American. mailings. We will take up this concern later on when examining the effects of the experimental intervention on those who received no preliminary mail.
[insert Table 1 here]
The GOTV mail that is the subject of this experimental analysis focused on the issue of discrimination. One mailer, for example, depicted a black motorist stopped by a white police officer brandishing a nightstick. The text surrounding the photo reads, "Stopped again? Start voting." The text on the reverse side reads:
Getting stopped for "Driving While Black" is swerving out of control. We all know someone. Or we've had to deal with the frustration of it. And racial profiling hasn't just stopped there. Now's the time to do something about it.
Vote. Let's start pulling the ballot lever and stop getting pulled over. Stop the madness. Vote. And get in the real driver's seat. Vote on Election Day, Tuesday November 7.
In certain states, listed in Table 1 , voters who had not earlier received a mailing on hate crime were sent a different version of this mailing, which again implored them to "Stop the madness. Write Governor George W. Bush and tell him that we need hate crime legislation." The phone and mail campaigns thus struck similar themes, and indeed were designed to reinforce each other insofar as the target population received both types of messages.
Method of assessment. In order to gauge the effectiveness of phone calls and direct mail, a random subset of the master list was assigned to a control group. This control group comprised 1.7% of the total list. This rate is virtually identical across the ten states analyzed here. Because people in the control group were selected at random, they were nearly identical to the treatment group in terms of age, past voting history, and other background characteristics. For example, among the 980,208 voters in our sample, the experimental treatment correlates -.001 with age, .001 with abstaining in at least one past election, .000 with whether the voter's phone number could be identified by a commercial vendor a year after the election, and -.001 with whether the voter was sent a preliminary mailing. 3 None of these correlations is significant at p < .10 using a twotailed test. Since the treatment and control groups differ only by chance in advance of the experimental treatment, the effectiveness of the phone and mail campaign may be assessed by comparing turnout rates in the treatment and control groups. Operational problems. The experiment was hampered by a number of deviations from an ideal experimental design. First, phone calls were inadvertently made to some of the people in the control group. This mistake occurred when lists of voters were shipped directly from the list vendors to the phone banks; the proper procedure was to send lists to the central data processing firm, which would have extracted a control group before sending the data on to the phone bank. Second, tens of thousands of names in the treatment group were neither called nor mailed. The lack of contact from the campaign in many cases occurred because vendors were unable to supply a person's working phone number. Although it is tempting to focus our data analysis solely on those people for whom a working number could be found, a third problem prevents this: the central processing firm, contrary to our instructions, did not attempt to obtain matching phone numbers for subjects in the control group. Thus, we do not have a matching control group for those with working numbers. Fourth, randomization was performed at the level of the individual name rather than the household. Since the chances of being assigned to the control group were just 1.7%, only a tiny fraction of those living in households with two or more voters were assigned entirely to the control group. This report therefore focuses on those households containing a single registered voter. This approach reduces the number of observations in our study and attenuates somewhat its generalizability to the African-American population as a whole.
[insert Table 2 here]
Despite these difficulties, it remains possible to tease out the effects of the experimental treatments so long as we make allowances for the mis-assignment of treatments. Table 2 shows the rate at which the treatment and control groups in the phone universe and the phone/mail universe were contacted by the campaign in each state. The fact that some of the treatment group never actually received the mail or phone treatments complicates the interpretation of the data, as does the fact that some of the control group received phone calls. Any observed differences in turnout between the treatment and control groups must be adjusted by a factor known as the contact rate. The contact rate is defined as the difference between the percentage of the treatment group who received the phone/mail minus the percentage of the control group who received the phone/mail. When an experiment treats everyone in the treatment group and no one in the control group, the contact rate is 100%, and no adjustment is required. In our study, contact rates are well below 100%. In Pennsylvania, for example, just 31% of the treatment group received a phone call as opposed to 11% of the control group, yielding a phone contact rate of 20%. Similarly, just 46% of the treatment group received the experimental mailings; since none of the control group received these mailings, the mail contact rate is 46% -0% = 46%.
In order to calculate the effects of direct mail or phone calls among those who actually receive them, one divides the observed difference in turnout between treatment and control groups by the contact rate (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Gerber and Green 2000) . This approach is identical to a two-stage least squares regression in which turnout is regressed on actually receiving the mail or calls, with random assignment as the instrumental variable. The one complication is that participants were not randomly assigned to combinations of mail and phone calls; rather, as noted in Table 1 , they were assigned to a single regimen based on their demographic profile and past voting history.
In order to distinguish between the effects of mail and phone calls, we make use of the fact that some participants were ineligible for mailings and that phone contact rates varied widely across states. Table 2 summarizes the pattern of treatments and turnout in each state. In Florida, Michigan, Missouri, and Pennsylvania, roughly half of the treatment group received the experimental mailings. In the remaining states, the mail contact rate was lower, and in North Carolina and Virginia it was zero. Phone contact rates also varied from a high of 30% in North Carolina to a low of 4% in Ohio. The large samples in Georgia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania make them useful, although their phone contact rates range from 20% to 26%. The last column of Table 2 shows the estimated intent-totreat effects in each state; this figure is simply the observed turnout difference between treatment and control groups. These estimates hover around zero. Four of the ten are negative, and the largest estimate occurs in the state with the smallest control group. The overall intent-to-treat effect may be estimated by an OLS regression of voter turnout on a dummy variable marking whether participants were assigned to the treatment or control group, using dummy variables indicating each state as covariates. This regression yields a 0.3 percentage-point effect with a standard error of 0.4. Based on this estimate, one would infer that direct mail and phone campaigns produced an additional 3300 votes among the 963,496 names assigned to the treatment group.
Results
The size of the intent-to-treat effect reflects both the weakness of the stimulus and the infrequency with which voters were contacted by mail or phone. In order to tease apart these two explanations, we disaggregate the data according to whether participants were eligible to receive direct mail. Tables 3 and 4 present the contact and turnout rates for each subgroup. The group that was ineligible for mail, as expected, voted at higher rates than its mail-eligible counterpart, but neither group shows a consistent pattern of positive experimental effects. Four of the ten intent-to-treat estimates are negative in Table 3 , and four of eight are negative in Table 4 . We will return momentarily to a more detailed statistical analysis of these two tables.
[insert Tables 3 and 4 here]
In an effort raise the statistical precision of these comparisons, we restricted our attention to those names for which a matching phone number could be found in the fall of
2001, a year after the experiment occurred. Although it may seem odd to append data after the experiment was conducted, the match rates for those assigned to the treatment and control groups was identical. Tables 5 and 6 show the contact and turnout rates for the subgroup with matching phone numbers. As expected, this phone contact rate is higher for this subgroup. Although we lose observations by restricting the sample in this way, we gain statistical precision by increasing the contact rate. The intent-to-treat estimates in Table 5 change a bit from Table 3 , with Georgia and New Jersey's effect rising and Michigan and Pennsylvania's falling, but the overall pattern remains similar across tables. Six of the ten intent-to-treat estimates are greater than zero in Table 5 .
Four of the eight intent-to-treat estimates in Table 6 are greater than zero.
[insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
Multivariate analysis. Table 7 summarizes the statistical analysis of actual treatment effects. These estimates are obtained using two-stage least squares. Using the subscript i to refer to individuals, the second-stage equation may be expressed:
The notation is as follows:
V i is scored 1 if the participant voted, 0 otherwise. [insert Table 7 here]
The first-stage equations model the receipt of phone calls and mail. Here, T i is scored 1 if the participant was randomly assigned to the treatment group, 0 otherwise. The system of equations has two endogenous regressors (P i , M i ) and two instrumental variables (T i , T i E i ), which permits the estimation of b 1 and b 2 , the actual treatment effects.
The first column in Table 7 Focusing exclusively on those whose phone numbers could be matched a year after the experiment reduces both the phone and mail effects to essentially zero.
Cost per vote.
In sum, across a range of alternative models, we find the maximal estimate of b 1 to be 2.7 percentage-points and the maximal estimate of b 2 to be 1.0 percentage-points. In our sample of single-voter households, the number of votes produced may be calculated using these maximal estimates:
Total Votes Produced = 333,126 x .027 + 362,416 x .01 = 12,619.
In order to calculate the approximate cost per vote, we may conservatively estimate the series of phone calls to have cost $2.00 per participant and the 2-3 pieces of direct mail to have cost $1.25 per participant. These rates imply a total expenditure of $1,119,272, or $89 per vote. Obviously, lowering the effect estimates raises the estimated cost per vote.
If we use, for example, the estimates derived from the model that includes covariates (Table 7 , column 2), we obtain:
Total Votes Produced = 333,126 x .027 + 362,416 x -.003 = 7,907.
This figure implies a cost-per-vote of $142. To put this figure in perspective, Gerber and Green (2000) and Green, Gerber, and Nickerson (2003) report that face-to-face canvassing generates one additional voter for each $12-$20 expenditure.
Spillover. One concern about these estimates is that they fail to take into account the possibility that those in the control group are influenced indirectly by the massive phone and direct mail campaigns going on around them. The control group represents 1.7% of the entire NVP list, and if the NVP campaign creates a wellspring of enthusiasm that indirectly affects the control group, the effectiveness of the treatment will be underestimated. One problem with this argument is that even in a state like Pennsylvania, where the campaign took place on a large scale, fewer than half of the people assigned to the treatment group received mail, and only about one in ten received phone calls. These figures are somewhat higher for multi-voter households in the NVF target population. Still, it should be remembered that just 21% (N=168) of the African American respondents to the 2000 National Election Study post election survey report having received direct mail from a group other than a political party and just 8% claim to have been called by such a group.
Nevertheless, the issue of spillover remains an important one, and in anticipation of this problem we performed the following experiment using randomly selected precincts in Missouri, Ohio, New York, and Virginia. Within each selected precinct, 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% of the names were randomly assigned to the control group. If spillover from treatment to control groups indeed attenuates the estimated effect of the treatment, we should observe stronger treatment effects in these precincts. This hypothesis is not borne out by an intent-to-treat regression of turnout on treatment group, controlling for each state. Among the 3,703 subjects in this experiment (none of whom were included in previous analyses), the intent-to-treat effect is -0.5 (SE=1.7). Including covariates for age, voting history, and matched telephone number raises this estimate to 0.7 (SE=1.6). It does not appear that spillover significantly attenuates the estimated effectiveness of direct mail or phone calls.
Finally, one might wonder how the analysis would have turned out had the study randomized at the level of the household rather than the level of the individual. Consider the case of two-voter households. Of the 437,390 households two-voter households in the primary experiment, just 126 were randomly omitted from any treatment whatsoever, but 14,469 households had just one person assigned to the treatment group. In addition, the spillover experiment described above allows us to compare an additional 334 untreated households to 490 half-treated households and to 755 fully-treated two-voter households. Consistent with our earlier findings, we find meager intent-to-treat effects among the full set of two-voter households. Controlling for state and the rate at which individuals were assigned to treatment and control conditions, we find that households in which neither voter was assigned to the treatment group voted at 1.5 (SE=2.2)
percentage-point lower rate than fully-treated households. Half-treated households are nearly indistinguishable from fully-treated households, voting at a 0.3 percentage-point lower rate (SE=0.3). The voting behavior of two-voter households, like that of their onevoter counterparts, suggests a weakly positive treatment effect.
Conclusion
The National Voter Fund's 2000 campaign consisted of many components, such as radio and television advertisements and door-to-door canvassing, that lie outside the scope of this evaluation. 4 The experiment described here focuses solely on the extent to which phone and direct mail increased turnout over and above other factors that might have impelled citizens to vote in the 2000 election.
These other factors warrant emphasis, because the treatment effects we estimate here are conditional on the volume of communications that voters received from other sources. One potential explanation for why the mobilizing effects of commercial phone calls and direct mail proved to be so weak in this case is that the recipients were showered with communications from candidates, parties, and interest groups. As studies of this sort accumulate, a key empirical question will be whether campaign communications diminish in effectiveness when competing communications abound. If true, this hypothesis would imply that campaign mail and commercial phone calls are much more effective in midterm, off-year, and municipal elections. To date, experimental studies, which have focused disproportionately on non-presidential elections, have not found markedly greater effects for partisan mail and commercial phone banks Green 2000, 2001) , but more studies are surely needed to address this question.
A related question concerns the comparative advantages of alternative mobilization techniques. The attractiveness of direct mail and phone banks stems from the fact that they provide political communication on a grand scale with very little lead time. Mailings may be prepared and distributed in a matter of days; phone banks may deploy messages in a matter of hours, which explains why money contributed very late in a campaign tends to be allocated to phone canvassing. Campaigns using door-to-door canvassing may be more cost effective (Gerber and Green 2000; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003; Michelson 2002) Finally, the current study paves the way for experimental evaluation of campaign activity by interest groups. While the flaws of the present study underscore the importance of maintaining tight control of the databases from which direct mail and phone calls emanate, the fact that this study was conducted in the first place attests to the willingness of interest groups and their financial backers to undertake a rigorous experimental evaluation. In contrast to most evaluations, this one focuses not on the quantity of campaign contacts but rather on how much these contacts altered voter turnout rates. No single experiment can resolve the myriad questions that could be asked about the effectiveness of alternative mobilization strategies; nevertheless, randomized evaluations such as this one provide a starting point for a scientific analysis of the conditions under which various campaign tactics stimulate voter turnout. Although experimental evaluation is now a rarity, one can readily imagine a point in time where such evaluations are not only standard operating procedure but serve as the basis for performance-based contracts. * Note that the pre-experimental mailing was sent with equal probability to treatment and control groups. **The experimental Hate Crime mailer was sent only to those who did not receive it in the pre-experimental period. Notes: Less than 1% of the control group received the experimental pieces of direct mail. The mailings consisted of two GOTV mailers and, for residents of FL, MI, MO, and PA, a third mailer concerning hate crime. 
